The study of the rapid acquisition Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program and its impact on the warfighter by Bulkley, Michael E. & Davis, Gregory C.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2013-06
The study of the rapid acquisition Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program and its
impact on the warfighter
Bulkley, Michael E.














The Study of the Rapid Acquisition Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 




 By:  Michael E. Bulkley 
  Gregory C. Davis 
June 2013 
 
Advisors: Michael W. Boudreau 









Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2013 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Joint Applied Project 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
THE STUDY OF THE RAPID ACQUISITION MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH 
PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLE PROGRAM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
WARFIGHTER 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Michael E. Bulkley and Gregory C. Davis 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER  
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. IRB Protocol number: N/A. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The purpose of this study is to document and analyze the benefit and shortcomings experienced by the various 
stakeholders, particularly the warfighters. It is also to determine if the accelerated acquisition strategy used for the 
Mine Resistance Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program provided sufficient benefits to the warfighter to become 
the model program for future U.S. military major acquisition programs? The urgent need for a vehicle capable of 
protecting the warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan against improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rocket-propelled 
grenades, and small arms fire, prompted the approval of an accelerated acquisition program for the development and 
purchase of the MRAP vehicle.  
The time from the initial needs statement in February 2006 to the first fielding of the first MRAPs was less than 18 
months. This accelerated acquisition process provided tremendous benefits; however, it was not without its 
shortcomings. Were the shortcomings outweighed by the benefits in this particular program, and most importantly, 
will this accelerated acquisition procedure used serve as a model for future major military acquisition programs? 






14. SUBJECT TERMS  
MRAP, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle, Accelerated Acquisition, Rapid Acquisition, M-
ATV, MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle 
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
101 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18  
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE STUDY OF THE MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) 
VEHICLE ACCELERATED DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAM 
 
 
Michael E. Bulkley, Civilian, United States Army 
Gregory C. Davis, Civilian, United States Army 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 









Authors:  _____________________________________ 
Michael E. Bulkley 
 
 
   _____________________________________ 
Gregory C. Davis 
 
    
 
Approved by:  _____________________________________ 
Michael W. Boudreau 
 
 
   _____________________________________ 
   John E. Stokes, Jr. 
 
 
   _____________________________________ 
   William R. Gates, Dean 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v 
THE STUDY OF THE MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED 





The purpose of this study is to document and analyze the benefit and shortcomings 
experienced by the various stakeholders, particularly the warfighters. It is also to 
determine if the accelerated acquisition strategy used for the Mine Resistance Ambush 
Protected (MRAP) vehicle program provided sufficient benefits to the warfighter to 
become the model program for future U.S. military major acquisition programs? The 
urgent need for a vehicle capable of protecting the warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan 
against improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms 
fire, prompted the approval of an accelerated acquisition program for the development 
and purchase of the MRAP vehicle.  
The time from the initial needs statement in February 2006 to the first fielding of 
the first MRAPs was less than 18 months. This accelerated acquisition process provided 
tremendous benefits; however, it was not without its shortcomings. Were the shortcoming 
outweighed by the benefits in this particular program, and most importantly, will this 
accelerated acquisition procedure used serve as a model for future major military 
acquisition programs? Answering these questions is the major focus of this study. 
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In February 2005, Marine Corps senior commanders operating in contingency 
areas identified an urgent operational need for armored tactical vehicles that would 
increase crew survivability and mobility of Marines operating in hazardous fire areas 
against improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms fire.  
The Marines initially identified the up-armored, high-mobility, multi-purpose wheeled 
vehicle (HMMWV) as the solution.  However, over the next 18 months this vehicle 
proved to be inadequate, as casualties continued to escalate. 
In February 2007, the DoD initiated the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
(MRAP) vehicle program to mitigate the threat from these weapons—particularly the 
IEDs—which were accounting for about 75 percent of the causalities in the combat 
operation in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  In order to expedite getting these vehicles into 
the hands of the warfighters as rapidly as possible, the DoD used a specially tailored 
accelerated acquisition approach.  This program approach relied on only proven 
technologies and commercially available products.  Only minimal operational 
requirements were established, and production, testing, and fielding were done 
concurrently.  Additionally, no mission equipment, such as communications and 
situational awareness subsystems, were purchased with the vehicles.  The government 
would be responsible for integrating this into the system after delivery from the 
Manufacturer. 
Recognizing that one producer did not possess the capacity to produce MRAPs in 
the required quantities, the DoD awarded Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) 
contract to nine different commercial companies, and agreed to buy at least four vehicles 
from each.  The DoD also designated the MRAP its highest acquisition priority. 
In September 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics designated MRAP as a major defense acquisition program with the Marine 
Corp Systems Command as the Joint Program Executive Office.  The approved 
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requirement of over 16,000 vehicles is split among the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air 
Force, and Special Operations Command and about $22.7 billion has been appropriated 
for this procurement.  The requirement for additional MRAPs will change over the 
coming years, and those changes will be discussed later in this study. 
There are three different versions of the MRAP vehicle acquired for different 
missions, termed Categories I, II, and III.  The smallest version of MRAP, Category I, is 
primarily intended for operations in the urban combat environment, and can carry up to 7 
personnel. Category II is a multi-mission platform capable of supporting different 
missions to include security, convoy escort, troop or cargo transport, medical, explosive 
ordnance disposal, or combat engineer operations, and can carry up to 11 personnel. 
Category III is the largest of three MRAPs, primarily intended for the role of mine and 
IED clearance operations, and can carry up to 13 personnel. 
B. PURPOSE 
The urgent need for a vehicle capable of protecting the warfighters in Iraq and 
Afghanistan against improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, and small 
arms fire, prompted the approval of an Accelerated Acquisition Program for the 
development and purchase of the Mine Resistance Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle. 
The timeframe from the initial needs statement in February 2006 to the first fielding of 
the first MRAPs, was less than 18 months. This accelerated acquisition process provided 
tremendous benefits; however it was not without its shortcomings. The Purpose of this 
study is to document and analyze the benefits and shortcomings experienced by the 
various stakeholders—in particular the warfighters—as a result of the shortened 
acquisition cycle.  It will also determine if the accelerated acquisition strategy used for 
the Mine Resistance Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program provides sufficient 




The scope of this study will be to analysis the MRAP Accelerated Acquisition 
Program in terms of the benefits and shortcomings experienced by the stakeholders in the 
areas of mission suitability, speed of fielding, maintenance support, supply support, and 
total cost of acquisition afforded the end user (warfighter)?  From this analysis, we expect 
to determine if the MRAP Accelerated Acquisition Program should be a model for other 
major military weapons systems.  
D. WHY IS STUDY IMPORTANT 
There are two major reasons that this study is important: one is the lives and well 
being of service members, and the other is money.  First, we need to insure that as we 
send soldier, sailors, marines, and airmen onto the battlefields, that our acquisition 
processes and procedures are working to provide them with the best equipment available.  
We want to provide the best chance for both mission accomplishment and survivability of 
the warfighters.   The second concern is that of money. Military budgets are decreasing.  
We can no longer afford to hastily buy a major military system, only to have to modify or 
replace it because it does not fit the requirements. Unlimited funds for military systems 
are no longer available, so it is necessary for our acquisition community to be more 
prudent and thorough in negotiating terms throughout the life cycle of a system. 
 4 
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II. MISSION REQUIREMENTS 
A. REQUIRED CAPABILITIES  
The MRAP vehicles were required to increase survivability and mobility of 
Marines and Soldiers operating in a hazardous fire area against known threats such as 
small arms fire, rocket propelled grenades, and improvised explosive devices.  
Marines and soldiers were expected to respond to a variety of missions.  To 
support these mission profiles, the U.S. Government sought two categories/configurations 
of the MRAP vehicle. MRAP vehicles were described as armored vehicles with a blast-
resistant underbody designed to protect the crew from mine blasts, fragmentary, and 
direct fire weapons. The two MRAP categories would consist of: Category I vehicles (six 
persons or more including driver) to support operations in an urban environment, and 
other restricted/confined spaces, including mounted patrols, reconnaissance, 
communications, and command and control. Category II vehicles (ten persons or more 
including driver) to provide a reconfigurable vehicle that would be capable of supporting 
multi-mission operations such as convoy lead, troop transport, explosive ordnance 
disposal, ambulance, and combat engineering.  
The MRAP would provide deployed commanders, various units, Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and combat engineer teams with survivable ground mobility 
platforms. In order to perform these multiple missions, it was required that the MRAP 
vehicles of both types be reconfigurable to meet a wide range of mission requirements for 
that type. Reconfiguration capability would be primarily accomplished by 
removing/adding passenger seats, and adding/removing Government Furnished 
Equipment (GFE) equipment, such as communications equipment, weapon stations, crew 
served weapons, ambulance litters, and equipment. The contractor was required to 
provide vehicles that provided flexible reconfiguration, but were not required to design 
the vehicles to integrate GFE items, unless otherwise specified by system requirements. 
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Performance requirements for both Category I and Category II MRAP vehicles 
were set forth in the MRAP performance specification. These requirements were as 
follows. all categories shall sustain a forward speed equal to, or greater than, 65 mph on a 
paved surface with a 0 percent grade. Under their own power, all vehicles shall be 
capable of sustained off-road speeds of no less than 5 mph. Under their own power, all 
vehicles shall be capable of sustained road speeds over trails of no less than 25 mph. All 
vehicles shall ascend a reinforced surface with a 40 percent grade at a speed of 10 mph. 
All vehicles shall ascend and descend a 60 percent longitudinal grade at a minimum of 2 
Miles per Hour (MPH). Each category shall ascend a grade of 5 percent at 45 mph in a 
forward direction. All vehicles shall be capable of operating on fuel carried in internal 
fuel storage tanks for a distance equal to or greater than 300 statute miles, at an average 
speed of 45 mph on a hard level surface. Each category shall demonstrate a minimum 
Mean Miles Between Operational Mission Failure (MMBOMF) reliability of no less than 
1,200 miles (1,931 kilometers (km) of operation. The Real Time Monitor (RTM) shall 
have an operational reliability of 0.90 based on an 18-hour mission day, which equates to 
a mean time between failures (MTBF) of 170 hours. 
Transportability requirements defined as follows. The MRAP shall be fit for self-
deployment on highways worldwide, with transportability requirements defined as 
follows. The MRAP shall be fit for self deployment on highways worldwide, and the 
vehicle shall be capable of being transported by rail, marine, and air modes in C-17 and 
C-5 aircraft in accordance with MIL STD 1366, as described in MIL HDBK 1791. The 
MRAP shall be capable of being transported by a C-130 aircraft (objective). The vehicle 
design shall enable preparation for fixed-wing air transport and reassembly, to be 
accomplished in no more than 60 minutes using only onboard tools (objective). 
Engine requirements were as follows. The diesel engine shall be capable of 
meeting all performance requirements in all environmental conditions using JP-8. The 
MRAP must also have the capability to complete its missions using JP-5 and commercial 
grade diesel as alternate fuels. 
The requirements outline the required protection for the vehicle and its occupants. 
All variants shall provide integral protection for the crew from blast, shock, fragments, 
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and fatal acceleration effects of mine blasts. The crew compartment shall withstand the 
blast effects, without breach of the floor, when a mine is detonated under any wheel, or 
directly under the crew compartment. All vehicle tires shall have a minimum a 30-mile 
run flat capability at 30 mph, on a hard surface road, after complete loss of air pressure in 
any two tires. The weapons turret for the USMC vehicle shall have the capability to 
support the Marine Corps Transparent Armored Gunner's Shield (TAGS).  
MRAPs are a family of vehicles produced by a variety of domestic and 
international companies that generally incorporate a "V"-shaped hull and armor plating, 
designed to provide protection against mines and IEDs. Per Joint Service requirements, 
the DoD AO detailed three categories of MRAP:Category I vehicles, weighing about 7 
tons and capable of carrying six passengers; Category II vehicles, weighing about 19 tons 
and capable of carrying ten passengers; and Category III vehicles, intended to be used 
primarily to clear mines and IEDs, weighing about 22.5 tons, and capable of carrying up 
to 12 passengers. Vehicles fitting these descriptions had been in use by the U.S. Army 
and U.S. Marine Corps since 2003, but in very limited numbers and for specialized 
missions, such as explosive ordnance demolition and other route clearance work. These 
vehicles quickly gained a reputation for providing superior protection for their crews, 
leading to a suggestion that similar vehicles might be a better alternative for transporting 
troops in combat than up-armored HMMWVs. 





Figure 1.   Category I MRAP 
 
 
Figure 2.   Category II MRAP 
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Figure 3.   Category III MRAP 
In Operations Iraqi Freedom in Iraq and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 
RPGs, mines, IEDs, and small arms fire had been responsible for over 30 percent of 
Marine Corps level III and IV casualties. According to audiotapes released in November 
2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi ordered his followers to "Block off all their main and 
secondary supply lines for these are their main arteries and ambush them along those 
routes for they are exposed and easy prey." The Corps was responding to the threat 
slowly because it took time for industry to build what was needed. As a result the enemy 
adapted before the Corps got a chance to protect Marines.  
Marine Corps senior leadership decided it had to develop an MRAP combat 
vehicle fleet capable of sustained operations in a chaotic, mine-infested, non-linear battle 
space. As casualties mounted, it became apparent that Marines must improve 
survivability for troops carried in ground vehicles. Operations in poorly protected 
vehicles resulted in casualties that degraded operational readiness and that were 
politically untenable.  
As of 2005, the enemy was no longer using conventional fighting tactics, but 
rather unconventional guerilla tactics. The Marine Corps responded to these guerilla 
tactics with a proactive-reactive strategy in order to increase the survivability of service 
members. Marines began armoring vehicles with steel from whatever source was 
available, and then as the threat grew and evolved, followed this ad hoc armor with 
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factory produced Marine Armor Kits (MAK) for HWWMVs, and Marine Armor Systems 
(MAS) for MTVRs. This was then followed with the acquisition of the further 
improvement in HMMWV protection, the Up-Armored HMMWV. These armoring 
efforts provided an immediate response to the threat that saved lives and reduced 
casualties.  
However, additional armor did not correct the deficiencies that still existed with 
the current ground tactical vehicle fleet. The MAK and MAS kits were employed to 
afford the time needed to launch a counter-attack aimed at the heart of the problem—the 
vulnerability of the existing ground tactical vehicle fleet.  
The existing ground tactical vehicle fleet did not have the survivability needed to 
support and sustain operations on the modern battlefield. While the U.S. had superior 
intelligence collection, training, and tactical skill, the enemy continued to exploit the 
vulnerability of Marines in the unarmored vehicle fleet. The most likely threat the 
Ground Tactical Vehicle Fleet (GTVF) was expected to encounter under the Ship to 
Objective Maneuver (STOM) scenario, was a combination of mines and small arms 
employed by conventional forces.  However, unconventional forces, operating in a non-
contiguous battle space with IEDs, posed a unexpected threat. The legacy GTVF was not 
designed to withstand this threat; it was designed to support the Cold War linear 
battlefield.  This created the requirement for a new capability which was addressed in a 
Universal Needs Statement (UNS) by the Marine Corps for the MIne Resistant Ambush 
Protected (MRAP) Vehicle.  This vehicle was designed from the ground up to increase 
survivability. This initial UNS was for the 1169 MRAPs for the Marine Corps, but later 
the numbers would be increased and incorporated into the other services. 
The Marines establish a Base Line Survivability Index BLSI for every Marine 






The MRAP needs to possess the following survivability baseline characteristics: 
• Protect the crew from IED/mine threat though integrated V-shaped 
monologue hull designed specifically to disperse explosive blast and 
fragmentary effects. Minimum protection should be 30 lbs TNT under any 
wheel, and 154 lbs anywhere under vehicle. 
• Protect the crew against 7.62 x 54mm armor-piercing ammunition at 30 
meters. 
• Protect from overhead airburst and side protection against fragmentation 
from 155mm shells, and blast protection against contact-detonated anti-
personnel and anti-tank mines. 
• Full NBC protected (this is an objective requirement, not threshold). 
• Vehicle should have transparent armor with rifle firing-ports on all four 
sides (similar to the Cougar or Casspir) that permit aimed from the 
standard service rifle with iron sights or optics. 
• Vehicle requires remotely operated weapons system to enable the gunner 
to operate, air, and engage targets from the fully protected sanctuary of the 
armored hull.  Access hatch to weapon system for loading/unloading or for 
manual operation of the weapon system is required. 
• The vehicle should be easily recoverable and repairable in the field, with 
modular components that are designed to break away from the vehicle in 
the case of a blast, with replacement components that can the reattached to 
the vehicle onsite. 
• H-60-like, non-retracting four-point restraint system bolted to floor for 
every single occupant of the vehicle – no one sits unharnessed.  All 
harnesses have single point quick release feature. 
• Crashworthy, shock-absorbing seat cushion material similar to aircraft 
seats designed to mitigate accelerative effects of mine blasts.  Seats should 
also be multi-positional with the emphasis on ability to fight effectively 
(outward field of vision to facilitate rapid weapons employment) and 
remove completely as required. 
• Three-hundred-and-sixty degree rollover protection. 
• Air conditioning and heat. 
• Vehicles should be modular and scalable.  Beyond their baseline 
survivability, they must be capable of having additional armor/stand-off 
screens attached to increase the protection to predestine ate and defeat the 




• The vehicle needs to have ample cargo space for pax, and the secure 
stowage of their equipment in anchored “bussle boxes” to minimize 
secondary projectiles that acceleration forces produce during a bottom 
attack mine incident. 
The requirement for MRAP was not limited solely to combat operations. However for 
the purpose of this study the focus will be only on its use in combat operations.   
B. QUANTITIES REQUIRED 
The DoD understood that no single vendor could provide all of the vehicles 
needed to meet requirements fast enough; therefore, several vendors were invited to offer 
their non-developmental solutions. This request for proposal made it clear that the 
government planned to award one or more IDIQ contracts to those vendors that were 
determined to be the best value to the government. The Marine Corps had the initial lead 
for this procurement and awarded IDIQ contracts to nine vendors.  In early 2007, the first 
delivery orders were established for four vehicles from each vendor to undergo initial 
limited ballistic and automotive testing.  Of the nine vendors awarded initial contracts, 
only five were able to produce acceptance vehicles.  These five were issued a round of 
delivery orders for a combined total of 395 vehicles. The quantities that would be 
purchased initially increased from the 1,169 vehicles for the Marine Corps—that had 
been identified in the 2005 UNS—to a requirement of 15,838 vehicles by July 2008.  
These were split between the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM), plus 133 for ballistic testing.  Table 1 displays a 








Table 1.   Approved MRAP Acquisition Quantities by Military Service and Other Users 
(From GAO 2008, Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
Vehicles) 
Service    Total 
Army    12,000 
Marine Corps     2,225 
Navy         544 
USAF          558 
SOCOM                     378 
Ballistic Testing                    133 
C. TESTING REQUIREMENTS 
Under conventional DoD acquisition Policy weapons systems are mandated to be 
fully tested before being fielded to the user.  However, because of the need to begin 
fielding survivable vehicle as expeditiously as possible, a phased testing approach was 
adopted.  This approach was designed to quickly identify vehicles that met the 
requirement for crew protection only, so that they could be rapidly fielded.   The test plan 
was comprised of three phases of Development Tests (DT) that raised the bar of the 
Incremental Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E).  This approach resulted in a great 
deal of overlap between testing and the actual fielding of the MRAPs.  Orders for 
thousands were placed before operational testing began, and orders for thousands more 
were placed before any operational tests were completed.  
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Figure 4.   MRAP Developmental and Operational Test Plan (From GAO, 2008) 
The three phases of developmental testing began in March 2007, and were 
scheduled to be completed by August 2008.  Each phase evaluated both the ballistic and 
automotive performance of the vehicles.  Phase I included a limited evaluation by users. 
Phase II evaluated further, the vehicles at the desired level of performance against the 
ballistic threat.  It also, added more endurance miles to the automotive portion of the test, and 
included mission equipment such as radios and other electronic systems. Phase III increased 
the standard  for ballistic performance to the emerging threat, and assessed non-ballistic 
protection to include near-lightning strikes, high-altitude electromagnetic pulse, and nuclear, 
biological, and chemical decontamination tests. 
 
The automotive portion of the test increased 
endurance to 12,000 miles per vehicle.  
In addition to the ballistic and automotive performance test mentioned above, the 
DoD also tested vehicles to determine their operational survivability, effectiveness, and 
suitability when operated by marines, sailors, and soldiers in simulated operational 
conditions.  In the testing, they used profiles that reflected missions found in combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. All initial phase testing was scheduled to be 
completed by August 2008. 
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III. SPEED OF FIELDING 
A. MRAP PROGRAM TIME LINE 
On February 17, 2005, the first Marine Expeditionary Force initially requested 
1,169 MRAP vehicles (Global Security.org, n.d.). The HMMWV used to this point 
proved to be incapable of withstanding the blast from the IEDs, now commonly being 
deployed against warfighters in the current theater of operation (Major Roy Mcgriff, 
2005). The MRAP vehicle, UNS, stated that an immediate need existed for an MRAP 
vehicle capable of increasing the survivability and mobility of Marines operating in a 
hazardous fire area against known threats. The Expeditionary Force Development Center 
(EFDC) was engaged in developing a course of action for the development of a future 
vehicle that provides the requested capability: However, its fielding would be years in the 
future, while an immediate solution was still needed  
On May 21, 2006, the Commanding General, Multi-National Force-West, 
submitted a Joint Staff Rapid Validation and Resourcing Request
 
for 185 MRAP-type 
vehicles to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). In July 2006, a second 
Joint Staff Rapid Validation and Resourcing Request were submitted to the JROC for an 
additional 1,000 MRAP-type vehicles. These requests ultimately resulted in the 
identification of a requirement for 1,185 MRAP-type vehicles for the Army, Navy, and 
Marine Corps and the initiation of a Joint MRAP acquisition Program. Listed below are 
the key dates and events in the MRAP acquisition program timeline. The LRIP dates 
listed below are further detailed in Appendix A. 
• November 2006—program begins 
• January 2007—IDIQ contracts awarded to nine manufactures 
• February 2007—ACAT II designation 
• February 2007—First LRIP production orders for 749 vehicles 
• April 2007—First Iraq fielding 
• May 2007—Designated as top priority DoD program 
• May 2007—Requirement increases to 7,774 MRAPs 
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• June 2007—DX rating approved 
• July 2007—5,690 vehicles ordered 
• September 2007—ACAT I designation  
• September 2007—JPO formed with representation from all services and 
USSOCOM; requirement increased to 15,374 
• October 2007—JPO Forward established in theater 
• December 2007—11,881 vehicles on order 
• February 2008—First Afghanistan fielding 
• May 2008—First MRAP expedient armor fielded  
• July 2008—15,020 vehicles on order  
• July 2008—Accepted 10,000th vehicle 
• September 2008—RFI for smaller, lighter, and more agile vehicle with 
MRAP protection 
• October 2008—Packard award 
• December 2008—M-ATV RFP 
• January 2009—Accepted 15,000th vehicle 
• February 2009—16,083 vehicle on order 
• February 2009—10,000th vehicle fielded in Iraq 
• April 2009—Initial ISS contract released for initial purchase 
• June 2009—LRIP 15  ADM for 5,244 M-ATVs validated by JROC 
• August 2009—1st Cougars with Independent Suspension Systems (ISS) 
delivered to Afghanistan. 1400 M-ATVs added to JROCM Requirements. 
• October 2009—LRIP 16 ADM increased to total MRAPs procurement 
authorization to 22,882  
• November 2009—JROC increased the AO to 26,882 
• January 2010—LRIP 17 ADM for 2,818 vehicles 
• June 2010—LRIP 18 ADM for 139 vehicles 
• October 2010—LRIP 19 ADM for 507 variants 
• November 2010—LRIP 20 Mod ADM 250 MRV vehicles 
• December 2010—JROC increased the AO to 27,344 
• March 2011—LRIP 18 & 10 Mod ADM 
• March 2011—LRIP 21 ADM for 648 vehicles 
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• June 2011—LRIP 22 for 400 vehicles 
• July 2011—LRIP 23 ADM for 170 vehicles 
The MRAP acquisitions were accomplished through a series of Low Rate Initial 
Production (LRIP) Decision Memoranda from 2007 to 2011.  Appendix A shows a 
detailed time line of LRIPs 1 through 23 and the quantity of vehicles order and the 
manufacturers. Figure 1 shows the dates and number of MRAPs for the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM) requirements, LRIP decisions, 
vehicles produced, and vehicles fielded from November 2006 through June 2011. The 
chart entitled Operational Demand Signal, Figure 2, shows the JROC validation point 
through June 2011. Through September 2012, 27,740 MRAPs rolled off the assembly 
lines of seven different manufactures. The Pentagon officially shut down MRAP 
production lines on October 1, 2012 (Sisk, 2012). 
 




Figure 6.   The Operational Demand Signal, (From MRAP Program Overview, August 
2012) 
1. (SPEED OF) MRAP Manufacturing 
On February 9, 2007, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development and Acquisition, Delores M. Etters signed an Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum (ADM), granting approval for the MRAP program to enter into acquisition 
at Milestone C under conditions which are outlined in the ADM at Appendix B.  This 
ADM approved the MRAP System entry into the DoD acquisition, at Milestone C (that 
is, entry into Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)) as an Acquisition Category II (ACAT 
II) program and authorizing a quantity of no more than 749 vehicles under LRIP 
restriction. In Figure 7, the yellow arrow shows where the MRAP entered the life cycle 
management system. The MRAP used an accelerated acquisition process, and under this 
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process, most of the life cycle management Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
Phase was skipped or accelerated to hasten the delivery of the MRAPs to the field.  
 
 
Figure 7.   The Defense Acquisition Management System Chart 
To accelerate the speed of acquiring and fielding the MRAP vehicle, the DoD 
used a tailored acquisition approach. The program manager’s office did not consider 
developing a product, but rather relied on existing technologies and commercial-off–the-
shelf (COTS) products and only minimum performance standards were included in the 
request for proposal (RFP). Realizing that one producer would not be capable of 
producing the number of MRAPs required, and in the specified time frame needed, the 
DoD awarded indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts to nine different 
truck producers, for the purchase of up to 4,100 vehicles per year from each vendor. The 
DoD initially committed to buying at least four vehicles from each manufacture. These 
vehicles would be evaluated in the following four areas: design, performance, 
producibility, and sustainability.  
MRAP 
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Perhaps supporting all the MRAP manufacturing, the factor contributing most to 
the ability to accelerate the manufacturing process was that the DoD designated the 
MRAP program as the DoD’s highest priority acquisition rating, which helped 
contractors and other industry partners by giving them priority access to needed resources 
to respond more rapidly to the urgent need and meet production requirements.  
B.  MRAP MANUFACTURES  
Of the nine initial manufactures that received contracts to build MRAPs, five 
survived: FPI, General Dynamics Land Systems Canada (GDLS-C), NAVISTAR 
Defense, BAE-Tactical Vehicle Systems (BAE-TVS), and BAE Systems (BAE). 
Oshkosh was added later to produce the M-ATV. 
Brief company profiles are listed as follows. 
C.  MRAP MAJOR CONTRACTORS 
• Force Protection Industries (FPI), Inc.—Ladson, South Carolina is a 
manufacturer of ballistic- and blast-protected vehicles from the United 
States that have been used in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and other hot 
spots around the world. MRAP Product Category I, II and IIIGeneral 
Dynamics Land Systems Canada—Ontario, Canada, a subsidiary of 
General Dynamics, It is a major supplier of armored vehicles of all types, 
including the LAV-25, Stryker, and a wide variety of vehicles based on 
these chassis. General Dynamics Land Systems operates the Lima Army 
Tank Plant and GDAO (General Dynamics Anniston Operations) in 
Anniston, Alabama. MRAP Product Category I. 
• NAVISTAR Defense—Warrenville, Illinois (formerly International 
Harvester Company) is a U.S.-based holding company that owns the 
manufacturer of International brand commercial trucks, MaxxForce brand 
diesel engines, IC Bus. Navistar is the prime supplier of MRAP armored 
vehicles to the U.S. military. MRAP Product Line, Category I & II. 
• BAE-TVS—Rockville, Maryland is a subsidiary of BAE Systems Inc. 
BAE plays a significant role in the production of military equipment. In 
2008, 95 percent of BAE Systems’ total sales were military related. 
MRAP Product Line, Category I & II. 
• BAE Systems—Santa Clara, California is also a subsidiary of BAE 
Systems Inc. MRAP Product Line, Category I & II. 
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• Oshkosh Corporation, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, formerly Oshkosh Truck, is 
an American industrial company that designs and builds specialty trucks 
and truck bodies and access equipment. It is organized into four primary 
business groups: access equipment; defense; fire and emergency; and 
commercial. MRAP Product Line: Oshkosh designed and manufactured 
the M-ATV. 
Figure 8 shows the major manufactures of MRAP, the categories, and the number 
they have produced. 
 
Figure 8.   The MRAP Family of Vehicles (From Johnson, 2013?) 
D.  FIELDING SPEED 
The entrance of the MRAP into the DoD acquisition process beyond Milestone C 
was the biggest factor contributing to the accelerated speed of fielding the MRAP. This  
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entry alone perhaps cut, by five to 10 years, the time it normally takes for a new system 
to go from Milestone A, the pre-system acquisition phase to Milestone C, the system 
acquisition and fielding phase. 
To expedite fielding of the vehicles further, mission equipment packages, 
including radios and other equipment, were integrated into the vehicles after purchase. 
This equipment had to be installed into the vehicles before they could be fielded to the 
user. Each military service required different equipment and was responsible for 
purchasing these systems and providing them as government furnished equipment (GFE) 
to be installed at a government integration facility located at the Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command in Charleston, South Carolina. 
The Space and Naval Warfare Center (SPAWAR) facility was used to integrate 
MRAP vehicles with GFE prior to fielding. This facility provided an optimal location for 
GFE integration because it had an experienced integration workforce, an on-site test 
facility, and accessibility to air, ship, rail, and interstate assets. SPAWAR also opened 
two other facilities to assist with the integration process. One was located in Orangeburg, 
South Carolina and provided a surge capability. It also served as a back-up location in 
case of a natural disaster at the Charleston site. 
The second additional site was located in Kuwait, and consisted of five 
integration bays, which were used to integrate a limited numbers of vehicles destined for 
delivery to units in that region.  
E.  TRADEOFFS IN ACHIEVING THE NECESSARY SPEED OF FIELDING 
AND ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
The fast delivery of MRAPs to the DoD to save lives in contingency operations 
was the biggest advantage of using the accelerated procurement process. However, this 
accelerated process also created several disadvantages. The accelerated procurement 
process used in the acquisition of the MRAP took advantage of existing technologies, and 
eliminated the need for a long developmental process. Contracts were ultimately awarded 
to five different existing truck manufacturers and each produced their version of the 
MRAP. Each of these five manufactures produced a MRAP vehicle with unique designs, 
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different operating procedures, and different maintenance and support requirements. The 
advantage afforded the DoD in using this approach was quick delivery to the users in 
order to save lives. However, the disadvantage was that each of these different versions 
of MRAP required different maintenance procedures and different repair parts.  
The maintenance required for five different versions was either five different 
technicians to support each different version or a single technician with the training to 
support several or all versions. Maintenance support is addressed in a later chapter, but 
the maintenance for the MRAP was contractor supported in the beginning. The 
disadvantage of course included the number of contractors required, the requirements for 
contractors on the battlefield, and the added cost. The different services have not yet 
projected or budgeted for the long-term MRAP sustainment costs. 
Another factor that enhanced the fast delivery of MRAPs was that they were 
purchased without mission equipment, such as radios and intercoms, GPS, visual display 
enhancements, and IED defeat systems. This type of purchase allowed each military 
service to equip their MRAPs uniquely to their particular mission requirements. Each 
military service bought subsystems for their vehicles and provided them as government 
furnished equipment (GFE) to be installed at a government integration facility located at 
the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command in Charleston, South Carolina. 
Although this process afforded accelerated delivery from the manufacturer, it proved to 
have the exact opposite effect at SPAWAR; it delayed delivery of the finished mission 
ready MRAP to the warfighter. The fact that five different versions were being made by 
five different manufacturers further complicated and added to the time required to install 
the GFE. In addition, each military service, (Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corp) 
had different configurations that resulted in a mix of vehicles being integrated at one 
time. SPAWAR addressed this problem by cross-training workers to install the GFE on 
multiple vehicle configurations.  
It was a disadvantage to send the finished MRAPs to a facility to have GFE 
installed, which certainly delayed the delivery of the MRAP to the users. However, since 
it was necessary to install GFE at a different location after delivery from the 
manufacturer, SPAWAR provided the best location for this integration. It provided 
 24 
excellent access to air, ship, rail, and interstate assets. Thus, once the GFE integration had 
been completed, MRAPs could be shipped out expeditiously.  In addition using a 
government integration facility: (1) simplified contracting issues that might otherwise 
have caused contractual delays; (2) opened up availability of an additional skilled labor 
force, which may have relieved labor shortages at the separate contractor facilities; and 
(3) may have provided opportunities to balance workload among variants, which could 
not have been accomplished at the separate prime contractor facilities. 
Two other SPAWAR facilities, one in Orangeburg, South Carolina provided for a 
surge capability and served as a back-up location in case of natural disaster at Charleston, 
and another in Kuwait that was used to integrate limited numbers of a vendor’s vehicles 
for delivery to units in the region. This initial GFE integration at the Kuwait facility was 
completed May 2008, according to the 2008 GAO document. However the Kuwait 
facility continued to do upgrades and modifications through 2011. 
According to this GAO document, the concurrent test and production strategy for 
the MRAP vehicle that helped to field the vehicles quickly resulted in the fielding of 
vehicles with significant operational issues. While most of the vehicles met requirements 
against the ballistic threat in the first phase of developmental testing, it was later revealed 
that the initial versions of MRAPs were not suitable for some mission terrain. A number 
of these issues would require modifying the vehicle designs, postproduction fixes, or 
adapting the way vehicles were used. Making additional changes in vehicle design or 
modification added cost in time, money, and operational readiness rate.  
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IV. MAINTENANCE SUPPORT  
The MRAP maintenance concept consists of those actions necessary to sustain its 
operational capability, which include both preventive (scheduled) and corrective 
(unscheduled) maintenance. The initial maintenance support plan was designed to consist 
primarily of contractor maintenance support, and then gradually transition into more 
organic military support. The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) was contracted 
to provide Field Service Representatives (FSR) who would perform Intermediate Level 
(I-Level) maintenance at the Regional Support Activity (RSA) sites. I-level maintenance 
personnel would remove, replace, and repair engine turbochargers, starters, alternators, 
air compressors, oil pumps, filters, external oil lines, oil pan, and water pumps. They 
would also remove and replace complete engine assemblies, front and rear seals, valve 
covers, brake assemblies, intake and exhaust manifolds, and replace fuel pumps, 
alternators, starters, water pumps, transmissions, and differentials. The OEM FSRs were 
not authorized to overhaul/repair or rebuild engines or differentials; these items were 
classified as Non-Repairable Assemblies (NRA) at the organizational and intermediate 
levels and were to be replaced as assemblies. The using activities were authorized to 
remove and replace only these items; their repair and overhaul would be accomplished 
through Depot Level (D-Level) maintenance.  
A. LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE 
The MRAP maintenance support concept plan consists of three levels of 
maintenance: organizational, intermediate, and depot. 
The organizational operator/crew and organization-level mechanics maintenance 
includes those tasks that consist of planned and/or corrective maintenance actions 
performed by the operator/crew, and organization-level mechanics crews, and will 
generally include the following: 
• Preventive maintenance checks and services such as inspections, 
lubrication, cleaning, preserving, tightening, checking and topping-off 
fluid levels, inspecting fittings and connectors, fuse replacement, and 
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performing minor adjustments with common shop tools found at the 
organizational maintenance level. 
• Limited troubleshooting and repair 
• Monitoring and reporting system conditions 
Crewmembers, whether deployed or at home base, will conduct maintenance at 
this level on-site. Approximately 90 percent of all malfunctions will be detectable and 
correctable at the organizational level.  
The intermediate [field level] maintenance level involves those tasks beyond the 
capability of the operating crews and organization-level maintenance. Specially trained 
mechanics and technicians perform maintenance at this level. Intermediate maintenance 
includes the following.  
• Inspection/in-depth diagnosis, modification, replacement, adjustment, and 
limited repair or evacuation/disposal of principal end items and their 
selected repairable, components/subcomponents 
• Calibration and repair of Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment 
(TMDE), including the fabrication of items, precision machining, and 
various methods of welding 
Maintenance at this level will be conducted in a semi-protected environment on-
site, whether deployed or at home base.  
Depot [sustainment level] maintenance level maintenance tasks sustain equipment 
throughout its life cycle by performing the following.  
• Major repair, overhaul, or complete rebuild of parts, subassemblies, 
assemblies, or principal end items 
• Manufacturing parts and conducting required modifications, testing, 
calibrating, and reclaiming 
• Support of lower level maintenance by providing overflow maintenance 
services and performing on-site maintenance services including technical 
assistance when required 
Maintenance at this level occurs at a multi-commodity maintenance center, other 
services depots, commercial industrial facilities, OEM, or a combination thereof to 
perform this level of maintenance. 
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Due to the number of MRAP variants and the number of different manufacturers, 
it was necessary for the U.S. military to contract with various companies to conduct 
maintenance work for the MRAP vehicles.  
BAE received a contract worth $23.8 million for spare parts replacement, 
instructor and maintenance support, and other services for the 2,850 Caimans MRAPs in 
Iraq. The spare parts and replacement items would include improved front seats and 
electrical connectors, as well as retrofitting door assist systems that were to be completed 
by January 2010.  
U.S. Logistics is another prominent contractor for the MRAP Maintenance 
Support. The U.S. Logistics (2008) Website stated the following.  
The U.S. Marine Corps in contract M67004-09-F-0581 dated June 30, 
2009, mandates 16 to 360 maintenance personnel from Albany, Georgia, 
to repair and overhaul USMC vehicles at Barstow, California. They also 
stated that they had provided MRAP support since April 2007 for various 
OEM programs including an Afghanistan/Iraq SOCOM MRAP Driver 
Trainers/Maintainers program. In these programs, U.S. Logistics trained 
U.S. Army SOCOM members on operational and technical procedures of 
the RG31-RG33 and CAIMAN series MRAPs. USL also assist in 
maintaining, modifying, and generally supporting SOCOM units with 
daily maintenance and “upper echelon maintenance issues and procedures. 
(U.S. Logistics, 2008)  
U.S. Logistics (2008) also provides FSR support on all MRAP series to U.S. 
Army units/Soldiers deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. These employees 
support Army units from Brigade down to Company level by maintaining, modifying, 
requisitioning of parts, quick fixing, and guiding as support to the MRAP program. 
U.S. military operations are dependent on industry partner assistance in the 
maintenance and combat readiness of MRAP equipment.  
The military partnered with MRAP suppliers and contractors in establishing an 
effective maintenance and sustainment framework. A hybrid approach is used with 
contractors working in tandem with organization-level mechanics. An evolving effort 
occurs to place greater emphasis on organic military capabilities. Also, as MRAPs were 
introduced in the Army and Marine Corps force structures, a limited  number of MRAPs 
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were made available and sent to home stations where the warfighters had familiarization 
training on MRAP operations and maintenance before their deployment (Buxbaum, 
2010).  
Non-standard equipment, which is not part of the Army’s automotive training and 
supply support, requires special Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) assistance for 
maintenance and repair systems. The staffs of CLS contractors were embedded within the 
Army. Contractor personnel operated MRAP Recovery Vehicle (MRV) support at 
warzone and regional support levels. Support includes mechanics, parts management 
technicians, requisition and transportation specialists, trained armor-welders and related 
personnel (RCV/MRAP Contractor Logistics Support Service Market Survey of Interest, 
n.d.).  
Buxbaum (2010) stated that MRAP spare parts flowed normally through 
the military supply chain. The Defense Logistics Agency and TACOM 
play important roles in gathering data on demand and ordering. Navistar, 
which has global supply and dealer networks, brings its supply chain 
capabilities in MRAP repair and sustainment efforts. “This is where 
Navistar as an OEM and key member of the MRAP family provides a 
pretty good value offering to the government,” said Jim Grooms, director 
of fleet support at Navistar Defense. Navistar’s dealers in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have been recruited to provide Navistar MRAPs parts service 
for these areas. “We have leveraged our dealer network to the maximum 
extent possible,” said Grooms. “Our international truck business is 
supported through a vast international dealer network. Military vehicles 
are supported out of these commercial dealerships.”  
The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq meant additional MRAPs could be sent 
to Afghanistan in which the Marine Corps set up an infrastructure to support the vehicles. 
MRAPs withdrawn from Iraq passed through Kuwait for suspension system upgrades to 
support greater off-road movements necessary in Afghanistan.  
Aligning the vehicles with institutional requirements became serious as MRAPs 
became common among U.S. warfighters. Within a few years, technical and operational 
manuals for MRAPs were developed and parts catalogs for the vehicles were generated. 
The cataloging effort standardized parts for various MRAP vehicles. MRAPs funded 
through the normal budget by 2012, as against the current special wartime appropriations, 
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which made similar efforts more urgent. The expected adoption of MRAPs into the Army 
and Marine force structures meant the vehicles were brought to the home stations of the 
troops and MRAPs’ repair and sustainment facilities established stateside (Buxbaum, 
2010). 
CLS support in the war zone was in transition as the level and nature of American 
engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan evolved. The scope of work of CLS evolved to 
reflect changes within the Area of Operations (AO). Emphasis was placed on contractor 
use of the standard Army supply channels. The Theater Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL) 
was expected to evolve as well, with the presence of shop stock/bench stock in its place 
assigned and tailored to individual sites and missions. They were loaded to the Standard 
Army Management Information System (STAMIS), which was expected to result in a 
decrease in Theater ASL. Low-volume, low-demand, non-standard parts not ordinarily 
found in the Army supply system were contractor-held and considered as contractor 
managed ASL. As supported units assumed more ownership and self-reliance in the 
maintenance of equipment, CLS services shifted to emphasis on battle damaged and/or 
sustainment-level maintenance, which was contractually required. Military unit 
partnerships and their CLS support teams shifted to a different footing. Required CLS 
services transitioned throughout the contract. Any contractor must demonstrate a 
capability to shift focus and resources, to include fluctuations in required workforce, as 
the RCV/MRAP Contractor Logistics Support Service Market Survey of Interest 
document stated.  
The contractor provided skilled manpower and logistics support services to 
maintain a quality MRAP and RCV systems maintenance and sustainment program in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The total workforces of approximately 400 personnel were 
employed at 40 sites in Iraq and Afghanistan. Required skill sets included parts 
requisition and inventory management utilizing the Standard Army Maintenance 
System—Enhanced (SAMS-E) processes and procedures. Certified automotive 
mechanics and/or military MOS-trained mechanics with equipment automotive repair 
experience, vehicle diagnostics, troubleshooting, component calibration, armor weld 
repairs (certifiable), transportation management, field-level operations-administration and 
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maintenance training services. Fluency in English was a must. The U.S. government 
provided life support to include housing, work areas, and shop tools.  
Force Protection’s Cougar MRAP was designed not to rely on OEM-unique parts. 
To minimize stockage requirements, the ready availability of power trains, suspension 
system and axles was also desired. Equipment could also be repaired at the lowest 
possible maintenance level and vehicles can be returned to operational status within 48 
hours. 
As the Afghanistan infrastructure matured, additional repair sites were put in 
place with supporting troops at each site. Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command 
(TACOM) maintained four regional sustainment centers in Iraq until the drawdown. They 
currently maintain five regional sustainment centers in Afghanistan. A full-service 
facility currently exists in Kuwait where damaged vehicles are withdrawn from the fight, 
repaired and returned to the battlefield. 
B. EXTENT OF MAINTENANCE TRADED OFF FOR SPEED IN FIELDING 
MRAPS 
The rapid acquisition of MRAPs brought challenges in terms of training and 
sustaining the vehicles in the war zone. MRAPs have been in Southwest Asia for about 
five years, but they are not yet part of the armed services’ force structure. The warfighters 
have had limited opportunities to train in MRAP vehicle operation or maintenance at 
their home stations, despite the fact that MRAPs are supplied to troops in war theaters. 
Availability of labor and spare parts are the two most common issues in MRAP 
maintenance. The U.S. Army and the Marine Corps mechanics are less familiar with the 
MRAPs, so a challenge occurs in simplifying MRAP maintenance and sustainment 
processes. MRAP suppliers, in designing the vehicles, were considering that the 
availability of replacement parts could be assured. The MRAP all-terrain vehicle 
(MATV), the Oshkosh-manufactured MRAP, was built on a chassis of the Marine Corps 
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR). This commonality reduces logistics 
burdens. Oshkosh also provides spare parts that are common to both vehicle models; 
thus, spare parts and equipment are always available. Factory-trained technicians also 
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provide instruction and advice, or provide repair and maintenance work themselves 
(Buxbaum, 2010). 
The rapid acquisition of MRAPs also challenged communications 
equipment suppliers. Harris Corporation, supplier of SINCGARS (Single 
Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System) radios to MRAP vehicles, 
gave priority to the MRAP program over other programs in which it was 
involved. Harris has worked with the MRAP program for over five years, 
providing support in several ways such as providing the government with 
installation analysis to provide optimal solutions for radio placement, 
cabling, and antennas within the vehicles aside from providing 
communications equipment. The company initially established a support 
team consisting of 15 to 18 personnel and deployed them to Iraq, 
providing forward support for Harris radios systems, especially those 
installed in MRAPs. As MRAPs were shifted to Afghanistan, the Harris 
Corporation established a maintenance/repair facility in Afghanistan, 
expanding their capabilities, and increased their personnel strength to meet 
the support requirements. (Buxbaum, 2010) 
C. ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES 
The rapid fielding of MRAP vehicles to the war theater, according to Blakeman, 
Gibbs, and Jeyanthan (2008), was not without cost. At least 66 MRAP-related accidents 
happened between November 2007 and June 2008. Bad roads, weak bridges, or driver 
error, resulted in five soldier deaths and 40 MRAP rollovers. Those incidents could have 
happened with any vehicle, but may be emblematic of the trade-offs in fielding MRAPs 
rapidly. 
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command’s (2008) User’s Logistics Support 
Summary (ULSS) also details several challenges in the MRAP maintenance concept. The 
diversity of the MRAP vehicles is one of the biggest disadvantages of the current 
maintenance concept. Spare parts replacement was a problem because of the diversity of 
the parts used by these vehicles. Furthermore, stocking the spare and replacement parts 
for these vehicles, to keep them combat ready, is also quite a challenge. 
Another challenge has been the limited Internet connectivity/absence of the 3M 
system in theater. As a result, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) units have 
had  capture maintenance history/parts usage data and material movement for MRAPs 
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using an electronic 4790 2K/CK. Commanders need to document maintenance actions as 
well, including those performed by supporting maintenance activities. Commanders were 
responsible for capturing configuration data, including the additions and deletions of 
MRAP assets to unit inventory. Problems occurring on non-standard equipment that was 
not part of the Army’s automotive training and supply support system required special 
CLS assistance for maintenance and repair systems. 
The newness of the MRAPs in the war theater was also a big disadvantage. 
According to the RCV/MRAP Contractor Logistics Support Service Market Survey of 
Interest document, U.S. military operations were dependent on industry partner assistance 
in the maintenance and combat readiness of equipment. The U.S. military was not 
immediately prepared to train its personnel to conduct maintenance work on MRAPs. 
These disadvantages, however, were offset by the benefits that the Soldiers 
received in the rapid fielding of MRAPs, which saved the lives of many Soldiers. The 
lessons learned by the U.S. military in using the rapid acquisition process to field the 
survivable MRAP vehicles is, perhaps, another advantage that could be used in future 
defense acquisitions.  
D. UNIQUE TRAINING IMPLEMENTED TO SUPPORT ALL VEHICLES 
PRODUCED BY NUMEROUS MANUFACTURERS: ADVANTAGES AND 
DISADVANTAGES 
The 2008 GAO document stated that procuring MRAPs from different vendors 
complicated the vehicle maintenance and support process because of the unique design of 
each vendor, which required specific operating and maintenance procedures (p. 11). In 
less than 30 months, DoD fleet reached more than 15,000 MRAP vehicles, from at least 
five different vendors. The Army alone will have more than 10,000 vehicles. The MRAP 
program office had established a central training establishment at which maintainers were 
cross-trained on different vendors’ vehicles.  
According to the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (2008), the training 
concept for the MRAP is for provision by the USMC Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) of 
New Equipment Training (NET) to Multi National Force-West (MNF-W) personnel at 
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the RSA and fielding sites. A “MRAP University” was established at the Red River 
Army Depot (RRAD), Texas, to cross-train OEM FSRs/instructors, government 
mechanics/Logistics Assistance Representatives (LARs), and war fighter instructor/key 
personnel training to support Continental United States (CONUS) training. The Joint 
Consortium of FSRs that provides CONUS training on all MRAP vehicle variants is the 
outcome. The Operator New Equipment Training (OPNET) and Field-Level Maintenance 
New Equipment Training (FLMNET) Programs of Instructions (POIs), consisting of 
classroom instruction, on-vehicle instruction, and day/night driving instruction, are the 
basis of the MRAP University Training Support Package (TSP). 
For the Navy, the training concept for its MRAP units, consisting of Cougar 4X4 
vehicles, is the Operator and Maintainer NET focusing on operator/crew and maintenance 
tasks. The focus of the joint MRAP NET TSP is critical operator and maintainer tasks for 
all fielded MRAP Family of Vehicles (FoV) variants. The different units will handle the 
complete MRAP NET TSPs for sustainment training that accompanies supplemental 
vehicle training videos. The Navy works with the Marine Corps Liaison Officer (LNO) 
for the current GFE training in-theater. 
As an initial operator and maintenance training requirement, the OPNET is 
conducted for four days (40 hours) at hand-off sites after vehicle de-processing. The class 
size consists of 24 operators (four students to one instructor ratio). FLMNET, on the 
other hand, is held after vehicle de-processing at the unit’s maintenance location and unit-
based training locations with a class size of 12 mechanics (four students to one instructor 
ratio) and runs for five days (40 hours), according to the Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command (2008).  
FSRs and uniformed mechanics train at the RRAD in Texarkana, Texas. 
Participants of the consolidated training implemented by the Joint Program Office (JPO), 
and named the MRAP University, are comprised of the different services and the MRAP 
manufacturers. The MRAP University offers training to familiarize attendees with the 
most common MRAP vehicles. The MRAP University created to provide a place at 
which personnel can become familiar with operations and maintenance of the multiple 
MRAP variants is run by TACOM and has been active since November 2007. It has 
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offered both the Field Level Maintenance Training Course and the Operator Training 
Course, which are each 40-hour courses. They provide familiarization and operator 
training, an overview of maintenance, diagnostics and troubleshooting, and recovery 
procedures.  
MRAP University’s evolved from basic operator and maintenance training to in-
depth familiarization. The maintenance familiarization course now runs five weeks, while 
the operator familiarization course is now a two-week course.  
The Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia, also publishes a Smartbook that 
covers basic vehicle characteristics and employment for all MRAP variants. The MRAP 
University and the Smartbook provide operators and maintainers basic information in 
employing the MRAP vehicles.  
Some manufacturers have established their own facilities and offer training not 
just to their own personnel but also to service members and FSRs from other 
manufacturers. FSRs from competing MRAP manufacturers may see the proprietary data 
and technology of the manufacturer providing the training. However, since this training is 
considered support for the troops in the battlefront, it is also done for other 
manufacturers’ personnel as well. Force Protection Industries, Inc. (FPII) provides a 
training program and facilities offering 40 to 50 hours of FSR training per week.  
FSRs rotate with counterparts in theater after achieving certain skill levels, and 
returning FSRs share their knowledge with engineers and management stateside. The 
returning FSRs thus contribute to recommended changes in MRAP vehicles based on 
lessons learned from the theater. International Military and Government, LLC subsidiary 
(IMG), unlike other manufacturers, does not provide its own FSRs, but subcontracts 
DynCorp to provide FSRs for its vehicles.  
DynCorp International provides training and sustainment in the southwest Asia 
zone. Its personnel provide instruction on using the MRAPs, and its mechanics maintain 
the vehicles’ operational readiness in Afghanistan and Iraq. The corporation has 300 
personnel in the war theater, and each has signed a one-year Foreign Service agreement. 
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The willingness of DynCorp to support the equipment of non-Navistar vehicles is 
one example of the “consortium approach” in sustaining the MRAP. DynCorp is under 
contract to support the Oshkosh-manufactured M-ATV. This level of cooperation by 
DynCorp was groundbreaking.  
We have a number of MRAP OEMs and these vendors are usually serious 
about protecting their data. But we realized early on that because of the 
rapid deployment of the vehicles we could not control their distribution 
and meet the enemy threat. We could not hire indefinite numbers of field 
service representatives. warfighters have to feed and house these 
contractors, and we wanted to minimize the burden on the troops. 
(Buxbaum 2010) 
Cross-training of FSRs is vital to the operational availability of MRAP vehicles. 
FSRs capacitated the DoD to field MRAPs without trained maintenance personnel at the 
organizational level. Acceptance of this risk was based on urgent need. The process of 
maintaining the MRAP fleet also was leveraged on FSR knowledge and the skills of the 
U.S. military mechanics. The latter already possessed basic automotive maintenance 
skills for working on MRAPs, which is one facet of the JPO-accepted risk of fielding 
vehicles before developing a maintenance-training program.  
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V. SUPPLY CHAIN 
A. MANUFACTURING SUPPLY CHAIN 
1. Industrial Capacity 
In April 2007, the first MRAP vehicle industrial capabilities assessment (ICA) 
was issued by the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) Industrial Analysis 
Center. The goal was to make an initial assessment, analyzing the industrial base to 
determine the maximum capacity for MRAP vehicle production. 
On June 1 2007, the Secretary of Defense approved a DX rating for the MRAP 
program, this assured priority access to available material for MRAP Manufactures.  The 
DX rating provides the most important DoD programs priority access to scarce 
production resources; however, it does not resolve fundamental production capacity 
shortfalls.  For the MRAP production, industry leaned forward to increase their capacity 
in several areas by teaming, renting and buying new space and capital equipment.  They 
also engaged their subcontractors to ensure the subcomponents were ordered and 
received and available to support the increase in production in the coming months. 
In July 2007, Bill Greenwell, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Industrial 
Policy tasked DCMA to update its study and conduct an industrial capability assessment 
on MRAP prime contractors, and their subcontractors.  This study determined the 
production capacity and delivery capabilities necessary to meet a goal of producing 1,300 
MRAP’s per month, starting in December 2007. The assessment was completed in 
September 2007, and concluded that industry’s production capability in December 2007 
should be between 1,000 and 1,300 per month, which met the requirement of 1,300 per 
month.     
There were initially two primary bottlenecks of concerns in terms of supplies 
available for manufacturing; they were in the area of tires and steel.  In July 2007, 
production capacity of tires for MRAP class vehicles was less than 1,000 tires per month 
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but by January 2008 through the efforts of several DoD organizations and the tire 
manufacturers, MRAP vehicle tire capacity had increased from 1000 to about 17,000 tires 
per month.   This was accomplished by adding Goodyear as a second source to and also 
the addition of more tire molds at both Michelin and Goodyear.  This production rate was 
believed to provide sufficient capacity to meet projected production rates, and to sustain 
the vehicles in the field. 
Also of concern in manufacturing supplies, was armor plate and high strength 
steel plate. The United States has production rate of approximately 8,000,000 tons per 
month.  The total DoD demand for steel of  was only approximately 21,000 tons per 
month which is only a fraction of the US total monthly production, there is still, however, 
a problem..  The issue is, the Defense Department has unique, niche requirements for 
armor steel plate and thin gauge, quenched and tempered steel. These specialty steels 
require unique processes and special equipment. and these are not available at plants 
producing commercial grade steel for the general global market. This demand for 
specialty steel products at high volume of production, created spot capacity shortages that 
not only affected MRAP but also other defense programs.   
The Department’s Priority Allocation of Industrial Resources (PAIR) Task Force 
was responsible for managing these industrial scarce supply issues. With their assistance, 
the industrial base was able to increase capacity for specialty steel and to stabilize 
production rates, avoiding much of the potential material shortfall in steel plate. When 
the MRAP program began, compliant domestic sources were only able to produce about 
8,400 tons of this specialty steel required per month. To increase this capacity, slight 
specification changes were made to raise   throughput and encouraged steel producers to 
make capital investments.   
In the cases where domestic source restrictions limited access to the steel need, 
there 73were waiver processes available to tap non-compliant domestic sources as well as 
reliable non-domestic sources. 
10 U.S.C. Section 2533b prohibits the DoD from procuring end items, or 
components thereof, containing specialty metals not melted or produced in the United 
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States.  Section 2533b contains several exceptions, one of which states that the 
prohibition does “not apply to procurements outside the United States in support of 
combat operations or in support of contingency operations” (Young, 2007). 
On May 22, 207, Dr. Delores Etter, the Navy Acquisition Executive, formally 
determined that this exception applied to MRAP vehicles supporting ongoing 
contingency operations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East.  She also determined that 
this exception also applied to MRAP vehicles not in theater but used to for vehicle testing 
and those MRAPs used vehicles operator or troop training.  This exception was not 
invoked for other similar ground vehicle programs such as Stryker and Bradley.   
By January 2008, the DoD had access to about 20,900 tons per month of armor 
steel plate and thin gauge, quenched and tempered steel.  This supply essentially met 
production demands.   
There were other supply resources that were in short supply; however none prove 
to be challenging as the tires, wheels and steel shortages.  After the shortages in these 
areas were overcome, monthly production schedules for MRAP were always met.  
B. SUPPLY SUPPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS 
Because of the rapid acquisition and fielding of the MRAPs, the JMVP employed 
an Organic/Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) hybrid approach for supply support of the 
MRAP fleet in theater (Figure 9).  This hybrid approach used a combination of military 
and civilian personnel, in addition to Field Service Representative (FSRs) from the 
different manufactures, and commercial logistics products and skills.  These were to be 




Figure 9.   Hybrid Strategy (From JSP, 2010) 
The Supply Support goal for the MRAP Family of Vehicles was to acquire Parts 
though the DoD supply chain.  The Joint MRAP Vehicle Program JMVP was responsible 
for managing the Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) and activities required to transition 




Figure 10.   Maturing Supply Chain (From JSP, 2010) 
The MRAP Supply Support was executed in a phased manner. Initially, the 
JMVP, Services and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) purchased parts from original 
equipment manufacturers, (OEM) and provisioning data was received and validated by 
DLA. The Services would procure items from the appropriate supply chain sources. An 
MRAP Supply Chain Integrated Process Team (IPT) was formed, and it served as an 
overarching forum to coordinate logistical issues such as transportation, vendor capacity 
and priorities issues. It also monitored warfighter system issues, contracting 
methodologies, as well as forecasted requirements for parts. 
In order for the government to complete provisioning it purchased the necessary 
data to include provisioning technical documentation, and engineering data for 
provisioning. The supply support and provisioning path is shown in Figure 11.  
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Figure 11.   Supply Chain Evolvement (From JSP, 2010) 
The JPO funded sustainment spares at the wholesale and retail levels and initial 
spares in Allowed Stockade List (ASL)/Prescribed Load List (PLL) blocks. As previously 
discussed, the intent was for the MRAP FoVs to be supported using the current logistics 
and maintenance structures already established within each Services’ policies and to 
obtain repair parts available though their respective supply systems. Each Service had 
theater procedures in place to determine when a vehicle has an operational failure and 




Figure 12.   Repair Parts Flow (From JPO, 2010) 
Deployment spares facilitate vehicle repairs while deployed, and to maintain the 
required reorder point . Parts data and demand history was initially a responsibility of the 
CLS Program.  They were responsible for insuring proper spares stockage and 
distribution plans were in place. Determination of sustainment spares stockage level was 
based on anticipated consumption rates. To meet the deployment requirements, 
sustainment spares are configured as follows: 
• PLL. The PLL consists of operational spares, bench stock, and 
consumables such as, fuses, fan belts, filters, and bulbs. 
• ASL. The ASL consists of Class IX secondary items, reparables, bench 
stock, and consumable spares in support of organizational PLLs. ASL is 
held on the stock record account of each supporting Supply Support 
Activity. 
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1. Consumable Item Support 
DLA was the source used for the management and procurement of consumable 
item support.  The DLA was an integral member of the MRAP Supply Chain IPT and 
coordinated closely with the JMVP to provide consumable items needed to insure that 
vehicles were quickly returned to a fully mission capable status.  In order to maintain 
organic support so that orders could be processed through normal channels, DLA 
established stock numbers, initiated buys and placed consumables on the shelves for 
MRAP vehicle support in advance of final provisioning completion.  The JMVP 
formulated a Part Support Concept of Operations that outlined the organizational 
responsibilities and processes to provide optimal support to the warfighter regarding 
dead-lined vehicles. The DLA was an integral part of the solution, along with the vehicle 
OEMs which used an expeditious Emergency Buy process to quickly buy parts identified 
on deadline reports.  
2. Depot Level Reparable 
It was agreed that the Service assigned as Primary Inventory Control Activity 
(PICA) would be responsible for supporting Depot Level Reparable (DLRs) that had 
been provisioned and were being supported through normal supply channels. The USMC 
was designated as the primary inventory control activity (PICA) for Cougars and the US 
Army (TACOM) was designated the PICA all the other MRAP vehicles. 
3. Provisioning 
Provisioning includes technical identification of items for maintenance support 
Considerations, the source of supply and/or the manufacturers of the items. Part-
numbered or non-system NSNs (local NSNs) would be processed to Director for 
Logistics (DOL) via Supported Activity Standard Supply System/Standard Army 
Management Information System (SASSY/STAMIS). . The local NSN/part-numbered 
item would be procured from commercial suppliers and the appropriate Military Standard 
Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) status would be given to the unit that 
entered the requisition. Upon completion of catalog action requests, all files would be 
 45 
updated with assigned NSNs. The purchases of these parts would be reported to the 
Integrated Material Manager (IMM) in order to maintain accurate demand records.  
4. Initial Supply Support Package for Fielding 
MRAP vehicles were initially deployed with the OEM supplying the majority of 
major Assemblies/subassemblies and parts to maintain the vehicle. Each vehicle was 
suppose to have a 90-day Consumables Block and a set of a one year worth of Forward 
Deployed Blocks,  These block that consisted of both consumable and repair part items. 
In addition, Maintenance Workshop Blocks (MWB)  were supplied at a ratio of 1:10 
vehicles, consisting of consumables, repair parts, and major assemblies/subassemblies. 
The MRAP vehicle has now been shifted to an ASL/PLL support system and the 
ASL/PLL packages are provided at a ratio of 1:25 vehicles. 
• PLL/Shop Stock. The PLL consists of operational spares, bench stock and 
consumables. 
• PLL is held on the stock record account of the supporting Joint Supply 
Support Center (JSSC). 
• ASL. The ASL consists of Class IX repair parts, reparables, bench stock 
and Consumable spares. ASL is held on the stock record account of the 
supporting Supply Support Activity. 
• Battle Damage Parts. The BDAR parts are items necessary to repair battle 
damaged vehicles in Theatre. Battle Damage Parts Blocks are held by the 
JVP RSA facilities. 
Initial support package and pre-fielding support parts vendors for the MRAP sent 
kits to Defense Distribution Depot, Red River, Texas (DDRT), with the exception of 
most FPII parts, which were held by LOGCOM Albany prior to shipment? The parts for 
air shipment at DDRT would be entered into Facilities Assets Catalog and Tracking 
System for airlift clearance and processed for truck transportation to Charleston Air Force 
Base (AFB).  From there these parts would be airlifted by the Air Mobility Command in 
support of OIF and OEF. The cargo was tagged and tracked by means of a Radio 
Frequency Identification Device (RFID).  A shipping schedule was also provided to 
United States Transportation Command for advanced notification to the Tanker Airlift 
Control Center. 
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VI. MRAP PRODUCTION COST  
On October 1, 2012, a ceremony was held at the Pentagon to mark the end of 
production all vehicles in the MRAP program. Nearly 28,000 vehicles from several 
different manufactures and several different versions had been produced in the preceding 
five years, and 24,059 of those vehicles had been fielded to Iraq and Afghanistan. In 
total, from the program’s inception in 2007 through FY12, $47.4 billion had been 
appropriated. These vehicles have been credited with saving thousands of lives. 
This chapter depicts only manufacturing and modification costs.  Operations and 
Support Costs are not discussed in this report. Cost benefit analysis of MRAP has been 
the subject of other research, and will not be analyzed in this report. 
A. MRAP BASIC COST WITHOUT GFE 
To expedite the fielding of the MRAPs to the warfighters, these vehicles were 
ordered from the OEMs without GFE, which was integrated into the vehicles after 
delivery to the government. The average cost of a MRAP without GFE was a little over 
$500,000.  
The following charts show the individual MRAP cost per vehicle starting in 
FY2007 through FY2011; these are individual vehicle prices divided by category, OEM, 
and Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP). Figures 13–22 were taken from a Booz Allen 
MRAP Business and Financial Management (BMF) Team briefing on February 6, 2012. 





























Figure 15.   FY2009–2011 Production—Per Vehicle (Unit) Costs 
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Figure 16.   Cougar Per Vehicle (Unit) Costs by LRIP 
 
Figure 17.   M-ATV Per Vehicle (Unit) Costs by LRIP 
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Figure 18.   MaxxPro Per Vehicle (Unit) Costs by LRIP 
 








Figure 20.   Buffalo Per Vehicle (Unit) Costs by LRIP 
 
Figure 21.   RG-31 Per Vehicle (Unit) Costs by LRIP 
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Figure 22.   RG-33 Per Vehicle (Unit) Costs by LRIP 
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B. MRAP BASIC COST OF GFE INSTALLED 
The addition of GFE to the basic MRAP delivered from the OEM would typically 
add between $171,000 to $522,000, depending on the service branch and the mission 
profile of the particular MRAP. The Army typically purchased the least amount GFE for 
installation, whereas the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
purchased the most, on average $522,000 per vehicle (according to the Department of 
Defense FY2008 Budget Amendment for Global War on Terror (GWOT), Request 
Budget Justification Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, July 2007).  
• Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) items included IED 
jammers, intra-vehicle communication systems, radios, and 
tracking systems. The GFE items vary among the Services, which 
affects the overall unit price of the vehicle.  
• Army removed some GFE such as radios, tracking and surveillance 
systems from High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle’s 
(HMMWV) being replaced in theater and installed that GFE into 
the MRAP, which decreased the Army’s GFE cost per vehicle.  
• The Army and Marine Corps agreed to standardize GFE turret and 
intra-vehicle communication systems, while also adopting radio 
and jammer installation kits that allowed interchangeability.  
• Only USSOCOM installed a Remote Weapon Station (RWS), 
which cost $235,000 per vehicle and greatly increased the GFE per 
vehicle compared to the Services.  












Table 2.   Estimated Unit Cost of GFE by Service 
Estimated GFE Unit Cost Per Vehicle 
Service (Dollars in Thousands) 
Army $171 
Navy $300 
Marine Corps $280 
Air Force $297 
USSOCOM $522 
C. MRAP BASIC MODIFICATIONS COST 
There were several major modifications necessary once the MRAPs had been 




VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This project was conducted to determine if the Accelerated Acquisition Program 
used in the MRAP program should be a model for future DoD major military systems. 
The following three questions were asked. 
1. Question 1: What are the Benefits of the MRAP Accelerated 
Acquisition Program in Terms of Mission Requirements, Speed Of 
Fielding, Maintenance Support, Supply Chain, and Production Cost 
of Acquisition Afforded the End User (Warfighter)? 
The foremost benefit afforded the warfighter in terms of mission requirements 
was that of survivability, and the saving of Soldiers’ and Marines’ lives. To this end, the 
MRAP has performed admirably. Although the lives saved is a difficult metric to 
calculate precisely, the JPO for the MRAPs estimates that as many as 40,000 lives were 
saved; 10,000 in Iraq, and 30,000 in Afghanistan.  In terms of the benefits produced by 
the speed of fielding, again, saving lives would be the most important, if imprecise, 
metric. The time from the initial requirement to the first units appearing in the field was 
only 18 months.  A process that normally takes years under the traditional DoD 
acquisition system was accomplished in a matter of months.   
Maintenance support also was designed to save time. Turning to Field Service 
Representatives (FSR) contractor-maintainers, often former service members, 
maintenance support could be put in place expeditiously. Since maintenance training for 
a new piece of equipment is typically done prior to fielding, using FSRs allowed the 
MRAPs to be ushered into operation much faster because much less time was required to 
train FSRs than would have been required to set up and fill the pipeline for MRAP 
maintenance schools.  Supply support, initially provided by initial spares, was not 




Equipment Manufacturers’ (OEM) being the main source for repair parts, making them 
more difficult to get and expensive.  Parts shortages meant no real benefit was derived for 
the warfighter in this area.    
2. Question 2: What are the Shortcomings of the MRAP Accelerated 
Acquisition Program in Terms of Mission Requirements, Speed of 
Fielding, Maintenance Support, Supply Support, and Total Cost of 
Acquisition Afforded the End User (Warfighter)? 
The shortcomings of the MRAP as a result of the accelerated acquisition program 
were many. In the area of mission requirements, there were numerous shortcomings.  The 
major reason for so many shortcomings resulted because of the inherent tradeoffs 
necessary in the accelerated acquisition process used by the MRAP program.  The MRAP 
entered the DoD Acquisition Life Cycle at Milestone C and testing, which was limited, 
was done concurrently with manufacturing and fielding.  Many mission requirement 
shortcomings, such as inadequate suspension, rollover tendencies, and unsuitability for 
off road operations, would have been detected and resolved in the traditional testing 
phase.  Because MRAP used the accelerated acquisition process, these shortcoming were 
not discovered until after fielding, making it necessary for numerous modifications and 
redesigns.  Applying these took the MRAP out of service while being repaired.  FSRs 
provided maintenance support; although this support assisted in the speed of fielding, it is 
not without its downside. One downside was the enormous cost. However, even more 
important than cost, was that of limitation in terms of where on the battlefield contractors 
were allowed to go.  Equipment damaged in the combat areas was, in many cases, 
evacuated back to secure bases where the FSRs were located, to be repaired.  In addition, 
supply support became a major shortcoming.  Again, supply support was not initially 
provisioned for as the OEMs had only a limited supply of parts. Contracts to manufacture 
additional repair parts were not put in place until after the initial MRAPs were fielded. 
The other problem was that several different variants existed, which also negatively 
impacted supply support, increasing the logistics footprint on the battlefield. The total 
lifecycle cost of the MRAP program is still unknown and probably will not be determined 
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for years to come.  However, the initial acquisition cost and average MRAP plus 
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) is about 1.5 million dollars, as compared to the 
HMMWV that it replaced at $360,000.  
3. Question 3: Were Benefits Sufficient to Indicate That the MRAP 
Accelerated Acquisition Program Should Be A Model For Future 
DoD Major Military Systems? 
The biggest and most important benefit was that it saved many lives and the 
argument can be posed that this savings alone made it a success.   The accelerated 
acquisition process the MRAP program utilized was able to place lifesaving MRAPs into 
the hand of the warfighters in 18 months from the time the contracts were signed. This 
shaved years off of the traditional time that it normally takes to develop and field a 
military system.  The fact that the program was responsible for saving many lives and 
reducing injuries cannot be disputed.  However the question remains, “Is this a system 
that we can use as a model for future major military acquisitions?”  It is true that the 
traditional DoD Life Cycle Management System, which moves a system from cradle to 
grave, typically takes an average of 7–15 years to field a system.  However, these systems 
that make it through this process often remain in use for 30–40 years or more.  In the case 
of the MRAP and the accelerated acquisition process, after 5 years MRAP production has 
been ended and only a small percentage of those MRAPs produced are likely to remain in 
the system.  This does not provide a model for future purchasing of future major military 
systems.  This program was done for expediency; it was an emergency, and something 
was needed fast.  This situation was a case of “do you want it fast or do you want it 
completely right?”   In the case of the MRAP and the accelerated acquisition process, the 
choice was fast, and as a result, many things were not completely as we would like it.  “If 
you want it bad, you’ll get it bad.”  These shortcomings would have to be fixed later at 
increased cost and equipment down time.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Should the DoD continue to pursue shorter acquisition processes, it is 
recommended that further studies be conducted concerning well known practices, such 
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as: selection of non-developmental alternatives; dependence on mature technologies; 
tight controls on proliferation of user requirements; and system improvement through 
evolutionary acquisition.  Specific criteria must be established for determining if a 
particular item would be better suited for rapid acquisition or the traditional acquisition 
process.  Items that are more fully developed, using current technologies (referred to as 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and non-developmental items (NDI)), and already 
proven in terms of their  usefulness may be an ideal fit for an accelerated acquisition, 
whereas something that needs to be developed would be better suited for development via 
the traditional DoD life cycle acquisition process. It should be understood that both the 
accelerated acquisition process and the traditional DoD life cycle acquisition process are 
useful, but under different circumstances.  We need to understand that there is not just 
one right way and one wrong way.  There are many potential right ways to accomplish a 
particular end; the primary concern is that of efficiently and effectively obtaining the 
desired results and the understanding and the willingness to accept that there will always 
be tradeoffs. In the case of the traditional life cycle acquisition process, the major tradeoff 
is that it takes a long time, but usually arrives at least the 8 percent solution.  With the 
accelerated acquisition process, results can be achieved fast, but the tradeoff is that the 
solution may be only a 40–50 percent solution and require later changes and 
modifications. Both the accelerated acquisition process and the traditional acquisition 
process work; we just need to understand and accept the tradeoffs. 
 61 
APPENDIX A.  HISTORICAL PRODUCTION QUANTITY 
PROFILES 
LRIP 1: (February 2007) (215 vehicles – 592 total) 
 Procured 125 vehicles from FPII (CAT I & II Cougars) 
 Procured 90 vehicles from BAE (CAT I & CAT II RG-33) 
LRIP 2: (February 2007) (180 vehicles – 772 total) 
 Procured 20 CAT I from GDLS for Test 
 Procured 100 CAT I from OTC for Test 
 Procured 60 CAT I from PVI for Test 
LRIP 3: (April 2007) (1,000 vehicles – 1,772 total) 
 Procured 772 CAT I Cougar (FPII) for the USMC 
 Procured 228 CAT II Cougar (FPII) for the USMC 
LRIP 4: (May 2007) (1,214 vehicles – 2,986 total) 
 Procured 14 CAT III Buffalo (FPII) for the USMC 
 Procured 1194 CAT I MaxxPro (Navistar) for the Army 
 Procured 6 CAT I MaxxPro (Navistar) for Test 
LRIP 5: (June 2007) (471 vehicles – 3,457 vehicles) 
 Procured 223 CAT I Cougar (FPII) for the USMC 
 Procured 60 CAT II Cougar (FPII) for the USMC 
 Procured 10 CAT II MaxxPro (Navistar) for the Army 
 Procured 172 CAT I Cougar (FPII) for the Navy 
 Procured 6 CAT II MaxxPro (Navistar) for Test 
LRIP 6: (June 2007) (441 vehicles – 3,898 total) 
 Procured 5 RG-33 Ambulances (BAE) for the USMC 
 Procured 11 RG-33 Ambulances (BAE) for the Army 
 Procured 1 RG-33 CAT I (BAE) for the Army 
 Procured 169 RG-33 CAT I (BAE) for SOCOM 
 Procured 255 RG-33 CAT II for the Army 
LRIP 7: (July 2007) (1,925 vehicles – 5,823 total) 
 Procured 1170 CAT I Caiman (BAE-TVS) for the Army & Test 
 Procured 755 CAT I MaxxPro (Navistar) for the Army & Test 
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LRIP 8: (August 2007) (725 vehicles – 6,548 total) 
 Procured 100 CAT II Cougar (FPII) for the USMC 
 Procured 600 CAT I RG-31 (GDLS-C) for the Army 
 Procured 25 CAT I Cougar (FPII) for the USAF 
LRIP 9: (October 2007) (2,400 vehicles – 8,948 total) 
 Procured 399 RG-33 (BAE) for the Army 
 Procured 112 RG-33 Ambulance (BAE) for the Army 
 Procured 89 RG-33 (BAE) for SOCOM 
 Procured 800 Cougar vehicles from FPII 
 Procured 703 MaxxPro vehicles from Navistar for the Army 
 Procured 297 MaxxPro vehicles from Navistar for the USAF 
LRIP 2 Adjustment: (December 2007) (-174 vehicles – 8,774 total) 
 Discontinued the 100 Oshkosh CAT I vehicles from Test 
 Discontinued the 60 PVI CAT I vehicles from Test 
 Reduced the GDLS CAT I requirement from Test by 14 
LRIP 10: (December 2007) (3,138 vehicles – 11,912 total) 
 Procured 358 Cougars (FPII) to the USMC 
 Procured 668 CAT I Caiman (BAE-TVS) to the Army 
 Procured 1500 CAT I MaxxPro (Navistar) to the Army 
 Procured 600 CAT II RG-33 (BAE) to the Army 
LRIP 11: (March 2008) (2,283 vehicles – 14,195 total) 
 Procured 29 CAT III Buffalo (FPII) for the USMC 
 Procured 1024 CAT I Caiman (BAE-TVS) for the Army 
 Procured 743 MaxxPro (Navistar) for the Army, USAF, and Test 
 Procured 487 RG-33 (BAE) to the Army, SOCOM and Test 
LRIP 12: (July 2008) (825 vehicles – 15,020 total) 
 Procured 4 Cougar A2s (FPII) for Test 
 Procured 2 Buffalo (FPII) for Test 
 Procured 4 MaxxPro Dash (Navistar) for Test 
 Procured 2 Caiman (BAE-TVS) for Test 
 Procured 773 RG-31 (GDLS-C) for the Army and SOCOM and Test 
 Procured 40 RG-33 (BAE) for SOCOM 
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LRIP 13: (September 2008) (848 vehicles – 15,868 total) 
 Procured 8 CAT III Buffalos (FPII) for the USMC 
 Procured 13 Cougars (FPII) for Test 
 Procured 5 RG-31 (GDLS-C) for the Army and Text 
 Procured 822 MaxxPro CAT I (Navistar) for the Army 
LRIP 14: (November 2008) (400 vehicles – 16,268 total) 
 Procured 400 MaxxPro CAT I (Navistar) for the USMC 
Pre-LRIP 15 Requirements Adjustment (2010) (-30 vehicles – 16,238 total) 
 Adjustment to account for inter-service loans and reprogramming of CAT I and CAT 
II acquisition 
Requirements 
LRIP 15: (October 7, 2009) (5,244 vehicles – 21,512 total) 
 Procured 1565 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for the USMC 
 Procured 2598 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for the Army 
 Procured 65 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for the Navy 
 Procured 280 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for the USAF 
 Procured 643 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for SOCOM 
 Procured 93 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for Test 
LRIP 16: (October, 30 2009) (1,408 vehicles – 22,882 total) 
 Procured 1,333 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for the Army (includes 8 USAF reduction) 
 Procured 23 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for the USMC 
 Procured 52 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for the Navy 
LRIP 17: (January 29, 2010) (2,818 vehicles – 25,700 total) 
 Procured 1,460 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for the Army 
 Procured 1,050 MaxxPro Dash (Navistar) for the Army 
 Procured 250 RG-31A3 (GDLS-C) for the Army 
 Procured 58 RG-33 (BAE) for SOCOM 
LRIP 18: (June 28, 2010) (21 vehicles – 25,839 total) 
 Procured the authorized quantities in JDAB (May 10, 2010) 
 Procured 5 RG-31A3 (GDLS-C) for Test 
 Procured 6 RG-31A2 (GDLS-C) for Test 
 Procured 3 Cougar CAT I A2 (FPII) for Test 
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 Procured 3 Cougar CAT II A2 (FPII) for Test 
 Procured 4 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for Test 
LRIP 19: (October 22, 2010) (507 vehicles – 26,346 total) 
 Procured 175 MaxxPro Dash (Navistar) for the Army 
 Procured 250 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for the Army 
 Procured 82 M-ATV (Oshkosh) for SOCOM 
LRIP 20 (Modified) (November 16, 2010) (236 vehicles – 26,552 total) 
 Repeated previous MRV (Navistar) Test Requirement, but reduces the quantity by 4 
 Procured 225 MRV (Navistar) for the Army 
 Procured 15 MRV (Navistar) for the USMC 
LRIP 21: (March 8, 2011) (648 vehicles – 27,200 total) 
 Procured 177 M-ATV (w/UIK) (Oshkosh) for the Army 
 Procured 471 MaxxPro Dash (Navistar) for the Army 
LRIP 22: (June 20, 2011) (400 vehicles – 27,600 total) 
 Procured 100 M-ATV (w/UIK) (Oshkosh) for the USMC 
 Procured 300 M-ATV (w/UIK) (Oshkosh) for the Army 
LRIP 23: (July 1, 2011) (140 vehicles – 27,740 total) 
 Procured 140 MRV (Navistar) for the Army 
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APPENDIX B.  ACQUISITION DECISION MEMORANDUM FOR 
MRAPS 
 
Figure 23.   ADM For Low Rate Initial Production of MRAPs (From Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, 2007) 
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APPENDIX C.  MRAP COST BY APPROPRIATION 
The following charts depict the MRAP annual cost by Appropriation for RDT&E 
and Procurement from FY 2005–FY 2018.  Annual Cost is shown for the Army, Navy, 




























APPENDIX D.  MRAP AND FOV COST AND PHOTOS BY 
CATEGORY 
 
Figure 24.   MRAP Category I ($300,000–$550,000) 
 
Figure 25.   MRAP Category II ($540,000–$644,000) 
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APPENDIX E.  MRAP MODIFICATION COST AND CONTRACT 
NUMBERS 
Table 3.   MRAP Modification Cost and Contract Numbers 
Modification Contract Number Unit Price 
Improved Turret Drive System 
(ITDS) 
W56HZV-11-D-0131 $5,623  
Rollover Detection Warning System 
(RDWS 
M67854-11-D-5028 $850  
Blast Mitigation Mats M-ATV                                   W56HZV-09-D-0111 $1,726.14  
Bar Armor W56HZV-09-C-0311 $38K 
RPG Nets for M-ATV  W56HZV-09-R-0115 $38,835  
RPG Nets for MaxxPro Dash 1     W56HZV-10-D-0014 $46,790.81  
RPG Nets for MaxxPro Dash 2                  W56HZV-12-C-0201 $43,794.03  
M-ATV Underbody Improvement 
Kits (UIK)   
W56HZV-09-D-0111 $63,623.60  
MaxxPro Dash Survivability Upgrade     W56HZV-12-C-0404 $63,000  
Independent Suspension Systems 
(ISS) 
    
MaxxPro Plus ISS 1 M67854-07-D-5032 $168,463.09  
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